

3rd online meeting
Asian Epistemology Network
December 18, 2020
7 - 10pm (Shanghai)

1st session: Does Science Progress?

Speaker: Darrell Rowbottom (Lingnan University)

Commentators: Brad Weslake (NYU Shanghai), Xiang Huang (Fudan University)

Note: The session will start with the commentators, followed by responses, and general Q & A. Watch Rowbottom's presentation [here](#).

7:00 – 7:25 Commentators

7:25 – 7:40 Response

7:40 – 8:05 Q & A

2nd session: Memory, Knowledge, and Epistemic Luck

Speaker: Changsheng Lai (Shanghai Jiao Tong University)

Commentators: Andrew Moon (Virginia Commonwealth University), Shin Sakuragi (Shibaura Institute of Technology)

Note: a pre-recorded presentation will be posted prior to the meeting. The session will start with the commentators, followed by responses, and general Q & A.

8:10 – 8:55 Talk

8:55 – 9:20 Commentators

9:20 – 9:35 Response

9:35 – 10.00 Q & A

Title: Does Science Progress?

Speaker: Darrell Rowbottom (Lingnan University)

Abstract: Over the past decade, there has been a dramatic resurgence of interest in what scientific progress might be. However, the debate rests on shaky conceptual foundations and dubious implicit assumptions. In this talk, I will show how exploring the aforementioned foundations and assumptions – and trying to render vague ubiquitous metaphors such as 'the aim of science' more precise – leads to the identification of reasonable perspectives on scientific progress that have neither been appreciated nor scrutinised in the contemporary philosophical literature. I will argue that there is a strong possibility that the current debate is misconceived and that the titular question should be answered in the negative.

3rd online meeting
Asian Epistemology Network
December 18, 2020
7 - 10pm (Shanghai)

Title: Memory, Knowledge, and Epistemic Luck

Speaker: Changsheng Lai (Shanghai Jiao Tong University)

Abstract: Does ‘remembering that p’ entail ‘knowing that p’? The standard epistemic theory of memory (hereafter, ETM) answers affirmatively, while Bernecker (2007; 2010) argues the opposite by putting forward several cases where the subject remembers that p without knowing that p. In response, proponents of ETM express different intuitive verdicts about Bernecker’s alleged counterexamples (see Adams 2011; Moon 2013), while Bernecker (2011) just keeps insisting on his own intuition. This leads the current debate to an ‘intuition-mongering’ impasse as neither side seem to be able to show why their intuitions are preferable. This paper purports to advance this debate by revealing the tension between ETM and the prevailing anti-luck epistemology. Central to my argument is the fact that we often ‘vaguely remember’ a fact, of which one plausible interpretation is that our true memory-based beliefs formed in this way could easily have been false. Basing on prominent accounts of misremembering (e.g., fuzzy trace theory, episodic hypothetical thinking theory, and the hybrid theory) in philosophy of psychology, I will construct cases where the subject vaguely remembers that p while fails to meet the safety condition of anti-luck epistemology, which implies either that ETM is false or that safety is unnecessary for knowledge. The conclusion reached in this paper will be a conditional: if veritic epistemic luck is incompatible with knowledge, then ‘remembering that p’ does not entail ‘knowing that p’.